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Nearly half a century after August 1929 the debate has resumed about 
what produced the unusual length and extreme severity of the ensuing 
43-month contraction.  No new facts about that business contraction 
have become available that have led to revision of earlier judgments. 
Rather, new hands have imposed new, or reimposed old, patterns on 
the known facts. So we must ask whether the new hands do explain 
the known facts better than did earlier investigators or whether their 
explanations must be rejected because they do not fit the full set of 
known facts. 
In the '~OS,  '~OS,  and '~OS,  the prevailing explanation of  1929-33 was 
essentially modeled on Keynesian income-expenditure lines. A collapse 
in investment as a result of earlier overinvestment, the stock market 
crash, and the subsequent revision  of expectations induced through 
the multiplier process a steep decline in output and employment. The 
collapse in investment was consistent with a procyclical movement in 
interest rates and velocity. The revision of  expectations in turn set off 
a demand for liquidity that could not be met. The attempt to meet it, 
however, forced widespread liquidation of  bank loans with a resultant 
decline in the value of private claims and debts, leading to the failure 
of nonfinancial corporations, to bank insolvency, and to runs on banks. 
Try as the Federal Reserve System might, its easy money policies- 
For the Granger causality tests and the preparation of tables 4.1 and 4.2 I am indebted 
to Thomas J. Sargent. Milton Friedman, who read the first draft of this paper, suggested 
that I include the Granger test results and the chart of the inverse of the price level. I 
have also restructured the paper on his advice. My indebtedness to him in a more general 
sense should be obvious. I have also benefited from comments by Arthur E. Gandolfi 
and James R. Lothian. R. A. Gordon gave me detailed comments, which I acknowledge, 
as I also do the views expressed by the discussant, Peter H. Lindert. I am grateful to 
Linda Dunn for preparing the figures and tables other than 4.1 and 4.2. 
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as evidenced by the decline in short-term interest rates until the summer 
of 193 l-did  not stabilize the economy. 
In the Keynesian story, the quantity of money as such played no 
important part in the explanation of  1929-33.  The story was faithful 
to the prevailing belief that the importance of money can be measured 
by  the behavior of  interest rates,  and since econometric tests  that 
included an interest rate revealed no significant effect of the variable, 
that seemed to dispose of the need to consider the behavior of money. 
Fifteen years ago when Milton Friedman and I reviewed the facts 
about 1929-33,  we did, of course, have at hand a new monthly series 
on the quantity  of  money  outstanding.  Earlier estimates by  Currie 
(1935) and Warburton (1949, however, had measured the extent of the 
decline in the quantity of money over the contraction, so we did not 
discover the fact of  sharp decline. What we did illuminate was the 
process by which the decline in the quantity of  money was produced. 
This shed a new light on the course of the contraction. There were 
distinct stages of the contraction-it  was not all of one piece.'  The 
stages we noted  included:  (1) The period  prior to the first banking 
panic-that  is, August 1929 to October 1930. This period encompassed 
the stock market crash in October 1929, to which the Federal Reserve 
responded by a short-lived increase in the quantity of money. Subse- 
quently, an earlier decline in the quantity of money was resumed, but 
there was no attempt by banks to liquidate loans or by depositors to 
shift from deposits to currency. During this interval, the contraction 
would have been defined as severe relative to earlier ones. (2) The first 
banking panic, covering the final quarter of 1930, when the real econ- 
omy markedly worsened. (3) The first quarter of  1931, when signs of 
revival were nipped upon the onset of a second banking crisis in March 
1931. (4) The last half of 1931, when the response of the Federal Reserve 
to Britain's departure from gold was accompanied by another outbreak 
of  banking panic and a substantial deepening of  the real decline that 
persisted through the first quarter of  1932. (5) The second quarter of 
1932, when the Federal Reserve undertook  open-market purchases, 
following which there was a widespread revival in the real economy 
in the summer and fall. (6) The final six months of the contraction, 
when problems with the banks spread, the real economy turned down- 
ward  again, and  the contraction  ended with  a collapse of  financial 
markets. 
Thus, after the 1929 peak in business, five negative shocks in turn 
destabilized the economy: the stock market crash and four episodes 
of banking panic-in  the final quarter of  1930, from March to June 
193 1 ;  from August to the end of the year (the response to the currency 
crisis abroad); and a final outbreak of panic in the last quarter of 1932, 
culminating in the Bank Holiday of March  1933. There was at least 112  Anna J. Schwartz 
one positive shock-the  open-market purchases of March-July  1932- 
and possibly a second, if  we count the short-lived open-market pur- 
chase following the stock market crash. In our analysis,  we distin- 
guished the contraction in general from the banking and liquidity crises 
that punctuated  its course.  Our main  theme  was  that the effect of 
whatever economic forces produced the contraction was magnified by 
the unprecedented decline in the quantity of money resulting from the 
banking crises. Our ancillary judgment was that the Federal Reserve 
System could have prevented the monetary consequences of the bank- 
ing crises but failed to do so. 
Two published studies by Kindleberger (1973) and Temin (1976) have 
recently challenged the interpretation of  1929-33  in A Monetary His- 
tory, and an unpublished study by Abramovitz incidentally also offers 
a dissenting opinion. 
Kindleberger’s focus is on the world economic system in the interwar 
period.  He attributes  an  important  role,  in  propagating  the  world 
depression, to rising stocks and falling prices of world primary products 
after  1925  and to maladjustments inherited from World  War  I.2 He 
believes that the contraction in the United States was initiated by a 
decline in housing-that  it started as a mild contraction and was trans- 
formed into a depression by the stock market crash. In his view, during 
the initial phase of the depression, money was abundant and cheap, 
but  the  spread  between  interest rates  on high-grade and  low-grade 
assets proves that an increase in the quantity of money by itself would 
not have been helpful, that “one also had to improve credit-worthiness 
by improving the outlook” (p. 138). He traces the intensification of the 
depression to repercussions of the initial world contraction on the econ- 
omies of  the countries producing primary products, not to develop- 
ments in the United States, and emphasizes the halt in international 
lending to peripheral countries.  Given their limited gold and foreign 
exchange reserves, they were forced to sell their primary products for 
whatever they would bring. Tariff increases and quota restrictions by 
the  industrial  countries  exacerbated  the  problems  of  the  primary- 
producing countries and reduced world trade. On his reading, falling 
security prices and commodity prices, for which Kindleberger assigns 
no special responsibility to the United States, made banking systems 
everywhere vulnerable and led to the financial crisis of 193 1. He argues 
that the open-market purchases by the Federal Reserve in  1932 did 
little to relieve the squeeze on the economy outside financial markets 
and that only two means were available to achieve world recovery: (1) 
simultaneous programs of  government spending in all countries, and 
(2) simultaneous devaluations to create gold profits that would be avail- 
able for spending.  Conspicuous by  its absence is any discussion of 
monetary expansion and the liberation of monetary policy made pos- 113  Understanding 1929- 1933 
sible by floating exchange rates in the  1930s, a regime Kindleberger 
deplores. 
Peter Temin’s story about the contraction concentrates on the United 
States during the period beginning with the stock market crash through 
the end of  1930. It seems that it was not a disturbance in investment 
behavior but an unexplained decline in consumption and a decline in 
exports as a result of world agricultural depression that produced a 
decline in U.S. income. This set off a decline in the demand for money 
to which the supply of money passively adjusted. Action by the Federal 
Reserve to meet the demand for increased currency holdings, as de- 
positors  attempted  to convert deposits into currency in  the several 
rounds of bank runs that characterized the contraction, or to provide 
increased reserves to banks would not, in his view, have prevented a 
decline in the quantity of money. Had there been no endogenous bank 
failures that served to reduce the quantity of money, the deposit-reserve 
ratio would have declined in response to the fall in short-term interest 
rates,  and the decline in the quantity  of  money would  simply have 
occurred through a different route. Temin does not deny that action 
by the Federal Reserve to restrict monetary growth may have played 
a role in initiating the economic downturn in  1929. What he disputes 
is whether the Federal Reserve engaged in such restrictive monetary 
action subsequently, until the Federal Reserve’s sharp rises in discount 
rates in response to gold outflows in September 1931  when  Britain 
abandoned gold. I defer until a later point the specific points on which 
he challenges A Monetary History. 
Abramovitz’s perspective  is much broader  than cyclical develop- 
ments in 1929-33.  In his unpublished study, he attempts to introduce 
the behavior  of money into his analysis of U.S.  long swings, which 
hitherto had concentrated on their real aspects. The usual model of 
long swings views waves in real income as an interaction between real 
expenditures on the one hand and growth of stocks of labor and capital 
on the other, each explained by real variables. In his current work, 
Abramovitz finds that nominal income growth parallels  real income 
growth and proceeds to partition the swings in nominal income growth 
into its monetary elements-money-stock  growth and velocity change- 
and, in turn, money-stock growth into its components. He proposes a 
model in which nominal income growth and its handmaiden, money- 
stock growth, are governed by the growth rate of the sum of current 
merchandise exports and net  capital imports. U.S. factors affecting 
immigration, internal migration, railroad profits, the demand for urban 
buildings, territorial settlement, and other real matters, on this view, 
were important through their effects on the growth of merchandise 
exports and net capital imports. He then applies this hypothesis to the 
long swing centering on 1929-33  and suggests that the great declines 114  Anna J. Schwartz 
in merchandise exports both after World War I and after 1929 limited 
the scope for Federal Reserve action. He regards the great declines of 
nominal income as inevitable, short of implausibly drastic accelerations 
in the creation of Federal Reserve credit or in the high-powered money 
multiplier sufficiently large to offset the declines in the sum of mer- 
chandise exports and capital  movement^.^ 
Underlying these three reevaluations of old facts is the view that 
income changes dominated money changes during the interwar period. 
A test of that view is now possible and is presented in the first section. 
I consider the appropriate measure of monetary stringency in the sec- 
ond section. The reciprocal of the price level in the interwar period 
counters what Temin regards as the decisive evidence on the price of 
money as measured by short-term interest rates.4 I then comment in 
section 4.3 on the decline-in-spending explanations, including Temin’s 
version, and in section 4.4 on the explanations stressing international 
factors, referring not only to Kindleberger and Abramovitz but also to 
recent work on the Great Depression by Haberler, Meltzer, and Brun- 
ner and Meltzer, among others. I conclude in section 4.5 with some 
summary observations about cyclical experience with particular ref- 
erence to 1929-33.  In an appendix, I take up explicit criticisms of the 
explanation offered in A Monetary History. 
4.1  Money and Income: A Test of Causality 
The three reevaluations of the interwar years implicitly or explicitly 
regard the direction of change between income and money as running 
from income to money. Temin says his purpose is to discriminate be- 
tween the “spending hypothesis”  and the “money hypothesis,”  with 
which he identifies A Monetary History, as an explanation of 1929-33. 
As he states the money hypothesis, for Friedman and Schwartz (1963~): 
Either changes in the stock of money caused income to change, or 
vice versa. The resolution was equally simple. The stock of money 
was determined by a variety of forces independent of the level of 
income . . . and the direction of causation therefore must be from 
money to income, not the other way. (P.  14) 
Temin cites as the source of this passage our article on “Money and 
Business Cycles.”  Let me therefore quote from it: 
The key question at issue is not whether the direction of influence 
is wholly from money to business or wholly from business to money; 
it is whether the influence running from money to business is sig- 
nificant, in the sense that it can account for a substantial fraction of 
the fluctuations in economic activity.  If  the answer is affirmative, 
then one can speak of a monetary theory of business cycles or- 115  Understanding 1929-1933 
more precisely-of the need to assign money an important role in a 
full theory of business cycles. The reflex influence of business on 
money, the existence of which is not in doubt in light of the factual 
evidence summarized above, would then become part of the partly 
self-generating  mechanism  whereby  monetary  disturbances  are 
transmitted. . . . As  noted  above, Cagan  shows that  the public’s 
decisions about the proportion in which it divides its money balances 
between currency and deposits is an important link in the feedback 
mechanism whereby changes in business affect the stock of  money. 
Whatever our view was, it clearly cannot be described as one-way 
causation. Since we wrote, there have been important advances in the 
statistical analysis of the interdependence between two series. One test 
of  the existence and direction of causality between two series in the 
sense of Granger (1969) is reported here.5 According to Granger, “We 
say that  Y,  is causing X, if  we are better able to predict X,  using all 
available [past] information than if  the information apart from [past] 
Y,  had  been used”  (p. 428). The statistical test of  this formulation, 
using the method of least squares, is to estimate the linear regression 
of X,  on lagged X’s and lagged Y‘s  as 
(1963b, pp. 49-50) 
m  n 
x,  = 2 &jX,-j + 2 bjYt,, 
j=  1  j=  1 
where the &is and &’s are least-squares  estimates.  On the null hy- 
pothesis that  Y does not cause X, the parent parametersj,  j  = 1, . . .  , 
a, equal zero. The null hypothesis, with current income on the left- 
hand side (X,)  and money on the right-hand side (Y), is that income is 
not caused by money, in which case the Y variable (money) will have 
zero coefficients. Alternatively,  with current money on the left-hand 
side (X,),  the null hypothesis is that money is not caused by income, 
in which case the Y variable (income) will have zero coefficients. 
For money, the variable I used was monthly M2.  The choice of  an 
income variable for the interwar years is limited. The monthly personal- 
income series first becomes available beginning 1929. A proxy for in- 
come-bank  debits to deposit accounts at 140 centers excluding New 
York City-is  available for the period beginning 1919.6  The equations 
fitted, including a constant, a residual term, a trend term, and alter- 
natives with and without seasonal dummies, were the following: 
m  n 
j=  1  j=  1 
(2)  MONSUP, = Edj MONSUP,-~  + XS  PERINC,-,, 
m  n 
j=  1  j=  1 
(3)  MONSUP,  = 2dj MONSUP,,  + ze  BKDED,-j, 116  Anna J. Schwartz 
m  n 
(4)  PERINC,  = xdj PERINC,,  + xR  MONSUP,-~, 
j=  1  j=  1 
m  n 
(5)  BKDED,  = xdj BKDED,-~ + xfi  MONSUP,_,. 
j=  1  j=  1 
Table 4.1, covering the shorter period beginning 1929, with personal 
income as the income variable, and table 4.2, covering the longer period 
beginning 1919, with bank debits to deposit accounts as the income 
variable, report the probability of  obtaining a value of F greater than 
that actually obtained if the null hypothesis is valid [Prob (F >  f)].  If 
this probability is low, it indicates that the null hypothesis is implausible 
and can be rejected. Over the shorter period, one cannot reject exo- 
Table 4.1  Granger Causality Test Results, 1929-39 
Reg.  Prob  F-  Lags 

















































































Sources: MONSUP = M2, from Friedman and Schwartz 1970, table 1, col. 9. MONSUP2 
= Mz, as above, adjusted for exclusion of deposits in unlicensed banks, March 1933- 
May 1935, by applying the ratio of licensed and unlicensed bank to licensed bank deposits 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963a, table 15, cols. 4,2). PERINC = Personal income, OBE 
from Moore 1961, 2:  139. 
Note: All regressions  include a constant and linear trend, and regressions  (5H8)  and 
(13H16) (shown with asterisk), seasonal dummies also. Regressions are of the form 
m 
Xr =  u;Xr+;  +  p;Yr-, + residual. 
i= I  r=l 
Table reports marginal significance level of F-statistic pertinent for testing null hypothesis 
p, = pz = . . . = p.  = 0, which is the null hypothesis “Y  fails to Granger-cause X.” 
Wherefis the calculated value of the pertinent F-statistic, the marginal significance level 
is defined as prob [F  >  fl under the null hypothesis. 117  Understanding 1929- 1933 
Table 4.2  Granger Causality Test Results, 1919-39 
Reg.  F-  Lags 





























































Source: BKDED = Bank debits to deposit accounts, except interbank accounts,  140 
centers (excluding New York City), from U.S.  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 1943, pp. 236-37. 
Note: See note to table 4.1. Here, regressions (5)-(6) and (llH12)  (shown with asterisks) 
include seasonal dummies. 
geneity in either direction,  though  the probability  of  exceeding the 
observedfis,  with one exception [(  13), (14)], uniformly lower for those 
equations testing  the influence of  money  on income than for those 
testing the reverse relation. 
For the longer period, the situation is very different: not one of six 
regressions yields any evidence that income had a significant influence 
on money-the  lowest of the probabilities associated with the observed 
fis 0.24, which means that in at least one time in four, chance alone 
would yield as strong an influence of income on money as that observed. 
In sharp contrast, every one of the six regressions testing the influence 
of money on income yields a far stronger relation than could be ex- 
pected  by chance if  money  really had no influence on income. The 
least-favorable regression yields a probability of 0.003 for the computed 
f, which means that a relation this strong would occur by chance less 
than 3 times in 1,000. 
So far as these results go, then, for the interwar years as a whole, 
they clearly support unidirectional  causality running from money to 
income. The reverse hypothesis that Temin, Kindleberger, and Abra- 
movitz appear to embrace receives no support at all. For the shorter 
period, the results are not inconsistent with the passage I quoted above 
from “Money and Business Cycles”-mutual  interdependence of money 
and income, with money the senior partner; but neither do they give 
it much support. Perhaps the only conclusion they support is that eight 118  Anna J. Schwartz 
years7 is too short a period to give very much evidence on direction 
of causation, given the large random element in the month-to-month 
movements of  both money and personal income.* 
4.2  Measuring Monetary Stringency 
Temin has revived the Keynesian view that the importance of money 
can be measured by the behavior of interest rates. In Keynesian anal- 
yses, the measure  of  monetary  stringency is a rise in interest rates. 
The interest rate is regarded as “the price of money.” In quantity theory 
analyses, the price of  money is 1/P,  the inverse of  the price level. In 
the former case, stringency is reflected in credit markets. In the latter 
case, money  is  an  asset, actual and  desired holdings of  which  are 
adjusted through prices, so that stringency is reflected in a rise in the 
reciprocal of  prices. 
Figure 4.1 plots the reciprocal of the U.S.  wholesale price index, 
monthly, 1919-39.  It is of some interest that every monetary event of 
significance during these two decades is mirrored in the movements of 
the price of money. Moreover, the reaction of prices to each monetary 
event is either observed in the coincident month or within five months 
of the event. The monetary events in the three deep contraction phases 
of the interwar period-1920-21,  1929-33, and 1937-38-  are marked 
by vertical lines on the figure and identified by number above it. Table 
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Inverse of U.S.  wholesale price index, 1919-29 (1926 = 1.0). 
To identify the numbered monetary events on the figure, see 
table 4.3. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1949, p. 344. 119  Understanding 1929- 1933 
4.3  shows the lag in months in the price response to the monetary 
events li~ted.~ 
Figure 4.1 refutes the allegation that Temin makes that there is no 
evidence of monetary stringency in 1930 and 1931 before Britain aban- 
doned gold. I might also have entered dates of monetary events between 
1921 and 1929 but refrained from doing so, because during this period 
the Reserve System attempted to anticipate business movements, so 
the monetary events and the reaction of the price of money could be 
regarded as the common result of movements in autonomous spending 
or whatever third other force produces the cycle. For the three deep 
contractions of the interwar years, however, the Federal Reserve took 
policy  steps that cannot be regarded as necessary  consequences of 
contemporary changes in business activity. The restrictive actions were 
followed, with brief lags, by sharp declines in the quantity of money 
and sharp rises in the inverse of the price level. The one important 
expansive action-the  1932 open-market purchases-was  followed three 
months later by an end to large monthly declines in the quantity of 
money, and four months later by the largest decline in the inverse of 
the price level during the whole  1929-33  period. 
Table 4.3  Monetary Events Reflected in Inverse of U.S. Wholesale Price 
Index in Three Interwar Deep Cyclical Contractions 
Cyclical 
Contraction  Date of Monetary Event 
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Onset of first banking crisis 
Onset of second banking crisis 
Britain leaves gold 
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Last of large monthly declines in M2 
Final banking crisis 
Bank Holiday 
Announcement of final rise in 
reserve requirements 
Peak in M2 
















a +  5 for date of onset of  rapid rise in  1/P. 120  Anna J. Schwartz 
As it happens, we had never before made this particular use of the 
inverse of the price level, yet we had earlier dated the numbered mon- 
etary events, so this comparison is fresh and unbiased evidence. Frankly, 
we were surprised at how uniform the connection was. 
4.3  Decline in Spending 
I now turn to the detailed profile of the 1929-33 contraction provided 
by different investigators. Temin himself (1976) has reviewed critically 
earlier versions of what he terms the “spending hypothesis,” the class 
of explanations that account for the severity of the Great Contraction 
by the collapse of one or another category of expenditure. Temin finds 
that the data do not  support a fall in  autonomous investment-the 
leading candidate in the Keynesian approach. 
Temin reviews’O the versions of the spending hypothesis associated 
with the names of Alvin Hansen, R. A. Gordon, Joseph Schumpeter, 
Thomas Wilson, and Keynes himself and econometric models of the 
interwar period constructed by Ben Bolch and John Pilgrim, Lawrence 
Klein, Jan Tinbergen, and John B.  Kirkwood. He concludes that all 
of these versions are unacceptable because they rest on untested as- 
sumptions. He also reviews the long-swing or Kuznets cycle hypoth- 
esis. He asserts that it assumes that only a large shock-presumably, 
World War I-could have produced a large cycle in income. He then 
dismisses it because it cannot explain why the World War I shock did 
not generate a downturn until a decade later. He leaves open the pos- 
sibility, but is half-hearted in offering it, that the stock market crash 
and the fall in construction might have been the channels through which 
a mild downturn was converted into a severe one. 
In part, then, Temin provides a critique of both Kindleberger’s and 
Abramovitz’s approaches to 1929-33.  His own version of the spending 
hypothesis, however, turns out to be equally vulnerable. According to 
him, two unexplained developments in 1930 changed the nature of the 
downturn. The minor one was a decline of approximately $1 billion in 
constant prices in  American  exports as a result  of  “the  deepening 
world agricultural depression”  and “European  troubles independent 
of the United States. Events outside the United States therefore exerted 
a deflationary impact within this country”  (p. 68). 
The major unexplained  development, according to Temin, was an 
autonomous fall in consumption in 1930 (see table 4.4). He specifically 
rejects an explanation of the fall in consumption as reflecting the effect 
on wealth of the stock market crash, on the ground that the wealth 
effect was too small. In this sense he regards the fall as autonomous 
and unexplained. 
Temin’s conclusion that there was such a fall in consumption is based 
on regressions of total and nondurable nominal consumption spending Table 4.4  Cbanges in Macroeconomic Variables in Three Periods 
Change (in  Change (in  Change (in 
Percent or  Percent or  Percent or 
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage 
1920  1921  Points)  1929  1930  Points)  1937  1938  Points) 
GNP, current prices (billion $) 
constant (1958) prices 
Personal consumption expenditures 
Gross private domestic investment 
Net exports of  goods and services 
Government purchases of  goods and 
Implicit price index (1958 = 100) 
Unemployment rate 
services 
91.5  69.6  -23.9  103.1 





65.4  54.5  -16.7  50.6 









-  12.3 
- 9.9 
- 6.6 





90.4  84.7  -  6.3 
203.2  192.9  -  5.1 
143.1  140.2  -  2.0 
24.5  19.4  - 20.8 
- .7  1.9  +371.4 
30.8  33.9  +  10.1 
44.5  43.9  -  1.3 
(9.2)  (12.5)  (+  3.3) 
14.3  19.0  +  4.7 
1919  1921  1928  1930  1936  1938 
GNP, current prices (billion $)  84.0  69.6  -17.1  97.0  90.4  - 6.8  82.5  84.7  +  2.7 
constant (1958) prices  146.4  127.8  -12.7  190.9  183.5  - 3.9  193.0  192.9  -  0.1 
Implicit price index (1958 = 100)  57.4  54.5  - 5.1  50.8  49.3  - 3.0  42.7  43.9  +  2.8 
(10.1)  (12.5)  (+  2.4) 
Unemployment rate  1.4  11.7  +10.3  4.2  8.7  + 4.5  16.9  19.0  +  2.1 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, series F-I, F-3, F-5, F-48, F-53, F-63, F-66, D-86. Figures in parentheses are Darby’s (1976) estimates 
of unemployment rate. 122  Anna J. Schwartz 
on nominal current disposable income and nominal wealth for the pe- 
riod 1919-41.  Actual consumption expenditures were above the level 
predicted by these regressions for 1921 and 1938 but below the pre- 
dicted level for 1930. Hence Temin concludes that  1930 was unusual 
since consumption expenditures declined by more than would  have 
been predicted from the associated decline in income and from the 
behavior of consumption expenditures in the other interwar major con- 
traction years.” 
Temin also compares yearly first differences in  residuals from his 
regressions for 1921, 1930, and 1938 on the ground that a movement 
from a high positive to a low positive residual indicates a deflationary 
effect  on the autonomous component of  consumption. The year-to- 
year changes in residuals based on the regression were $6.1 billion in 
1921, -  $1.43 billion in 1930, and $1.81 billion in 1938. He then averages 
the changes in  residuals for  1921 and  1938, subtracts the change in 
residuals in 1930, and concludes: 
On the assumption that the [average] overprediction of  decline in 
consumption shown for 1921 and 1938 is the norm for this function 
in depression years,  the predicted decline in consumption was  $5 
billion too low in 1930. (P. 72) 
This is his current price estimate of the autonomous fall in consumption 
between 1929 and 1930, two-thirds of the total fall. In constant prices, 
the estimate is $3 billion of the actual fall in real consumption expen- 
ditures of $4.3 billion. Thus, according to Temin, before the onset of 
the October 1930 runs on banks, the economy was set on a course of 
deep contraction  by  the combined  autonomous fall of  $1  billion in 
exports and $3 billion in consumption expenditures. 
Questions immediately arise with regard to these estimates.  With 
respect to exports, the obvious question is whether the decline in U.S. 
exports was  attributable to events abroad independent of  the  U.S. 
cyclical  contraction.  I  shall deal  with this  question when I turn to 
explanations stressing international factors. 
Temin’s estimate of the autonomous decline in consumption expen- 
ditures raises questions of an entirely different order. In the first place, 
the consumption functions he fits are so crude by  standards of  the 
present state of the art that it is hard to take them seriously. Second, 
his assertion that the positive residuals he observes for 1921 and 1938 
from this questionable regression are the norm for interwar contractions 
is strictly an obiter dictum. He gives no basis for regarding 1921 and 
1938 as in some unspecified sense “normal”  contraction years.  But 
unless this is granted, he has no basis for regarding his small negative 
residual for 1930 as abnormal. 
Thomas Mayer (1978~)  in  a recent paper has reestimated Temin’s 
equations for the interwar years and has found larger negative residuals 123  Understanding 1929- 1933 
in other years of the period.  Why did the negative residual in  1930 
cause a deep contraction but the larger negative residual in 1925, for 
example, not cause one? This is ad hoc economics without qualification. 
Gandolfi and Lothian (1977), in a review of Temin’s book, fit a more 
sophisticated consumption function for the longer period  1899- 1941. 
They regressed the log of real per capita total consumption on the log 
of real per capita permanent income and the log of transitory income, 
defined as the difference between the logs of measured and permanent 
income. The inclusion of the transitory income variable is designed to 
reduce the effect of purchase of durable goods, as opposed to their 
flow of services, as a component of total consumption expenditures. 
Since purchases of durable goods are more cyclical than their service 
flows, they are more dependent on transitory than on permanent in- 
come. For the sake of comparison with Temin’s results, Gandolfi and 
Lothian  also examined year-to-year changes in residuals as well as 
their levels. They found 1930 far from unique. Of the five severe con- 
tractions other than 1930 (1894, 1896, 1908, 1921, and 1938), only 1921 
had a very large positive residual.  Overprediction of the fall in con- 
sumption expenditures, then, is hardly a normal feature of deep con- 
tractions. The negative value for 1930 is not abnormal by comparison 
with all years, not simply deep contraction years.  Of  41  changes in 
residuals, 14 are positive, 27 negative, of which 15 are larger than 1930. 
Of  all 41  changes, 25  are larger in absolute value,  15  smaller. Why is 
it that these 15 did not produce a violent reaction in economic activity, 
while the 1930 shift did? 
Temin combines his hypothesis that there was an autonomous decline 
in (nominal and real) spending relative to output with the hypothesis 
that the demand for (nominal) money was falling more rapidly than the 
quantity of money during 1930 and the first three quarters of 1931. The 
decline in the quantity of money itself he regards as a movement along 
a stable supply-of-money function in response to a downward shift in 
the demand function. For logical rigor, this statement needs to be sup- 
plemented  by  a  more precise  specification of  the arguments of the 
demand and supply functions+hanges  in which would equate quantity 
demanded with quantity supplied. 
For the demand for nominal money, Temin would presumably include 
as arguments the price level (or, the inverse of the price level), real 
income, and interest rates,  Assume, now, with Temin that for fixed 
values of the arguments, the nominal quantity of money demanded fell 
relative to the quantity supplied. To eliminate the putative excess sup- 
ply of money (that is, make money holders willing to hold it), prices 
would have to rise-but  they fell, which exacerbated the excess supply; 
real income likewise would have to rise, but it fell, again exacerbating 
the excess supply. The one remaining possibility is that interest rates 
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theory, then, Temin treats the whole process as an autonomous decline 
in liquidity preference reinforced by declines in prices and in real in- 
come produced by other (spending) equations in the system, and wholly 
countered by lower interest rates-in  other words, a large-scale shift 
of flow demand from goods to securities, and of stock demand from 
money to securities. But then, why no stock market boom? As Allan 
Meltzer (1976) points out, perhaps the temporary rally in the market 
in the spring of 1930 is consistent with Temin’s construction; so also, 
of course, is the decline in interest rates in 1930, but hardly anything 
else is. Indeed, put this way, the notion of a sharp decline in liquidity 
preference is hard to square with a severe contraction accompanied 
by  increasing industrial bankruptcies  and uqprecedented failures of 
banks. 
With respect to the supply function, under the gold standard in effect 
in 1930 and 193 1, both declining prices and declining real income would 
be expected to produce a gold inflow (which they did) and thereby 
increase the nominal quantity of money. Here too, therefore, Temin 
must treat the decline in interest rates as a sufficiently powerful force 
reducing the nominal quantity of money to have overcome the opposite 
influences of the other two variables. And apparently he does, since 
he argues that in the absence of  bank failures the same decline in the 
quantity of money would have occurred through a decline in deposit- 
reserve ratios. 
Temin presents no independent evidence of such great sensitivity of 
either demand for or supply of money to interest rates as would be 
required for his explanation. The general conclusion of most studies is 
that quantity of money supplied is largely insensitive to the interest 
rate (see Cagan 1965; Fand  1967; Rasche 1972) and that the quantity 
of money demanded is only moderately sensitive to the interest rate, 
displaying an elasticity a good deal less than unity with respect to long- 
term rates. 
The various versions of the spending hypothesis-ne  of which at- 
tributes the Great Contraction to an autonomous decline in investment, 
another to an autonomous decline in housing, a third to an autonomous 
decline in consumption and exports-cast doubt on the value for cy- 
clical analysis of the Keynesian distinction among investment, con- 
sumption, and net exports. The authors of the various versions write 
as if the cycle is necessarily propagated by the component of GNP that 
first reaches a peak or that is most volatile. Is this more than the most 
vulgar post hoc-propter  hoc reasoning? If not, where is the evidence? 
The particular category of expenditure that first reaches a peak may 
not be the trigger of the downturn but the first to respond to a common 
influence on all expenditures, and similarly the variability of housing 
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as Temin, for example, assumes in analyzing the German national prod- 
uct in constant prices, 1924-29  (p. 156). 
One other general  comment  needs  to be made  about Keynesian 
models.  It is difficult to understand how the experience of  1929-33 
could have spawned the notion of the need for the replacement of the 
classical assumption of a price-adjustment by a quantity-adjustment 
system of movement toward equilibrium. One key aspect of the con- 
traction was that the decline in nominal income was divided almost 
equally between a fall in quantities and in prices. Real income fell by 
more then one-third, implicit prices by more than one-quarter.  Why 
quantities changed as they did in response to price changes should be 
the goal of analysis. A model in real terms to explain a contraction in 
which price declines were so prominent is bound to serve imperfectly 
the cause of historical understanding.  ** 
Finally, no decline-in-spending model has ever been able to explain 
the detailed development of the contraction. 
4.4  International Explanations 
The  main  problem  with  Kindleberger’s  account  of  the  world  in 
depression is his assumption that, because the contraction was world- 
wide in scope once it got under way, it therefore did not originate in 
the United States. The U.S.  share in world trade, world capital and 
financial markets, and the world’s stock of gold has been sufficiently 
large since World War I to give the United States the capacity to initiate 
worldwide movements and not  merely to react to them. Of  course, 
once having initiated  a worldwide  disturbance,  it  would in  turn be 
subject to reflex influences. 
From 1923 on, the Federal Reserve sterilized much of the gold inflow 
into the United States, preventing the kind of expansionary effect on 
the stock of money and thence on prices that would have occurred 
under the prewar gold standard. Instead, the system sought, and to a 
large measure achieved, stable economic growth with falling wholesale 
prices. This achievement was largely at the expense of economic sta- 
bility in  Great Britain  and the peripheral  countries tied  to sterling. 
Britain’s return to gold in 1925 at a parity that overvalued sterling would 
have caused less difficulty for Britain if prices in the United States had 
risen instead of  falling thereafter. 
Similarly, any problems of agricultural depression in the peripheral 
countries before  1929 were not independent of  U.S.  policy. For the 
contraction itself, the record is equally clear. The stock market boom, 
which is said to have drained funds from the rest of the world, and the 
stock market crash occurred in the United States. The downward move- 
ment in the U.S. money stock, including the sequence of bank failures, 126  Anna J. Schwariz 
was not the consequence of influences from abroad. The gold inflow 
into the United States (during the first two years of the contraction) to 
which  reference will be  made  below is further evidence that other 
countries were being forced to adapt to the U.S.  monetary policies 
rather than the reverse.  The decline in U.S.  lending abroad and the 
protectionist Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act were clearly U.S. actions that 
destabilized the world financial system.  l3 
The United States was no pitiful, helpless giant on whom the rest of 
the world inflicted the Great Contraction. It is true that when the pound 
and other currencies were cut loose from gold in 1931, the U.S. trade 
balance was adversely affected and speculative pressure on the dollar 
developed. These devaluations, however, were themselves the reflex 
consequences of the U.S. contraction, and even so, their subsequent 
effects were not crippling, given the size of the U.S.  economy. 
This point is also relevant to both Temin’s assumption that the decline 
in U.S. exports was independent of U.S. actions and to Abramovitz’s 
analysis. Temin never alludes to the monetary standard of fixed ex- 
change rates that enforced a worldwide decline in income and prices 
after  1929.14 The central role of the United  States in  the worldwide 
scope of the contraction is attested to by the balance of payments.15 
If the decline in income in the rest of the world was being transmitted 
to the United States, we should have observed a balance-of-payments 
deficit in the United States, leading to a gold outflow. However, the 
U.S. gold stock rose by nearly $200 million from the annual average 
of  1929 to that of  1930. From August  1929 to August  1931, the gold 
stock rose by over $600 million. The gold inflow strongly suggests that 
any decline in U.S.  exports to the rest of the world was attributable 
to the effects on the rest of the world of contraction here. 
Likewise, Abramovitz, by assuming that there were forces making 
for a major decline in the dollar value of U.S.  exports independently 
of U.S. monetary actions, is able to conclude that there was a significant 
constraint on the power of the Federal Reserve to sustain the growth 
of the money stock. In fact, however, there were no such forces. The 
gold inflows contradict the assumption that the initiating force was a 
serious decline in the dollar value of our export market independent 
of what was happening in the United States. The other exogenous factor 
for Abramovitz’s  analysis-net  capital imports-is  also an item that 
was crucially determined by events within the United States. In the 
1930s the decline in U.S. capital exports may have been exogenous in 
the sense that the state of the capital market abroad and the prospective 
yields on investment in various foreign countries discouraged capital 
exports. But equally the volume of saving available for capital export 
relative to the volume of investment demand at home were important 
endogenous elements. Internal developments in the United States enor- 
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Is  the monetary  approach to the balance  of  payments  helpful  in 
understanding 1929-33?  The theory asserts that the active element in 
the balance-of-payments adjustment process is the equalization of the 
quantity  of money demanded with the quantity  of  money supplied. 
Flows of specie are interpreted as responses to changes in demand for 
or domestic supply of money in various countries. A reduction in the 
public’s demand for goods and securities leads to reduced imports and 
expanded exports on the goods side and to higher interest rates and 
capital imports on the securities side. The current account or  the capital 
account or both move into surplus. Although the law of one price has 
frequently been associated with the monetary approach, some adher- 
ents allow for significant slippage between the rate of  change of do- 
mestic prices and of world prices. Similarly, some adherents also ac- 
commodate interest rate differentials  between  domestic and foreign 
assets in their versions of the monetary approach. 
Are the gold flows and price movements, 1929-33,  consistent with 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments? As already noted, 
from August  1929 to August  1931, there was a gold inflow of $600 
million. An increase in the demand for money in the United  States 
relative to other countries, or a decrease in the supply of money in the 
United States relative to other countries, or any combination would 
be required by the monetary approach to account for the inflow. Such 
a change in the relative demand or supply of money would be mani- 
fested in a decline in U.S. wholesale prices relative to those in the rest 
of the world-either along with the inflow or as an intermediate step 
in producing the inflow. If changes in wholesale prices shown in table 
4.5 for various countries are reliable, the 1929-31 decline in U.S. prices 
was steeper than in France and Germany, but not in the other countries. 
From the time Britain cut the pound loose from gold in September 193 1 
until July  1932, the United  States had a gold outflow of  $1  billion, 
absorbed principally by France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Neth- 
erlands. The outflow would be interpreted as a relative increase in the 
demand for or decrease in the supply of money in those countries. The 
data on wholesale prices in the United States and France confirm an 
only slightly steeper rate of price decline in France than in the United 
States during this interval. The return flow of gold to the United States 
until the climactic weeks before the Bank Holiday in March 1933 re- 
stored the U.S. gold stock so that it was only $80 million lower than 
at the cyclical peak in business in 1929. Again, a relative increase in 
the demand for money in the United States and a steeper rate of  price 
decline in the United States than abroad would be consistent with the 
inflow. This seems to be the case from September 1932 to February 
1933. 
It does not seem to me that the discussion of the international setting 
of  1929-33  as set forth in A Monetary History requires modification. Bble 4.5  Percentage Changes in Wholesale Prices at Annual Rates for Various Countries, 
1929-33 
Annual Rates of  Change 
From  To  U.S.  France  Japan  Canada  U.K.  Germany  Italy 
~ 
Aug.  1929  Mar.  I933  -13.1  -11.9  - 5.8  -11.8  - 9.2  -11.6  -  12.3 
Aug.  1929  Sept. 1930  -12.2  - 6.7  -22.3  -16.0  -14.9  -10.8  -  14.1 
Sept.  1930  Sept. 1931  -17.0  -16.2  -13.6  -16.9  -15.2  -12.3  -  16.2 
June  1932  Sept. 1932  + 6.5  -11.5  +53.7  - 3.1  +16.0  - 4.6  +  4.0 
Sept.  1932  Feb.  1933  -17.6  - 5.3  +16.8  - 8.5  - 7.6  -10.0  -11.5 
Sept.  1931  June  1932  -13.0  -14.3  - 3.0  - 6.5  - 1.5  -16.2  - 9.5 
Sources: US.:  U.S.  Bureau of the Census, 1949, p. 344.  France: Librarie de Recueil Sirey 1937, table 11. 
Japan, Canada, U.K.,  Germany, Italy: League of Nations 1929-33, table 10. The U.K.  index was constructed 
by  the Board of  Trade; the Italian index is labeled “Bachi.” 129  Understanding 1929-1933 
Countries within the British orbit along with Britain were depressed 
during the '20s while the rest of the world prospered, partly thanks to 
U.S. capital exports. When the U.S. capital flow declined in 1928 and 
virtually ceased in the succeeding years, the economic position of the 
formerly recipient countries deteriorated. The gold exchange standard 
made the international financial system vulnerable. Given the attach- 
ment to fixed exchange rates, there was no way for other countries to 
insulate themselves from the effects of U.S. contraction. Deflation in 
the United States forced an adjustment on the rest of the world reflected 
partly in the gold inflows to the United States, partly in internal defla- 
tion  necessary to avoid or reduce  further gold flows.  We  exported 
deflation and depression to the rest of the world. Even though deflation 
abroad then reacted unfavorably on the United  States, much leeway 
still remained for U.S. policy. 
4.5  Understanding 1929-33 
For Temin, 1929-33 was characterized by the absence of two equi- 
librating factors: a decline in real wages and a strong real-balance effect. 
Real wages in manufacturing, as the quotient of nominal wages divided 
by wholesale prices, were higher on both hourly and weekly bases in 
1930, 1931, and 1932, and also on an hourly basis in 1933. Real wages 
in manufacturing, as the quotient of  nominal wages divided by con- 
sumer prices, were higher on an hourly basis in every year except 1932 
but lower in every year on a weekly basis. From the hourly wholesale 
price deflated series, Temin concludes that the marginal physical pro- 
ductivity of labor rose as employment fell, which is consistent with the 
classical theory of factor substitution: lowering the wage rate further 
might have avoided unemployment. The weekly consumer price de- 
flated series shows, however, that this was a vain hope, since lower 
wages decreased the level of demand. He adds that if the real hourly 
wage series deflated by  consumer prices is more accurate than  the 
wholesale price deflated series, then no part of the classical theory is 
accurate. 
I do not believe, however, that we  can gain an understanding of 
1929-33  by  assigning a central role to real wages. Further, by dis- 
missing the evidence of  the hourly  wholesale  price deflated  series, 
Temin fails to see a link between it and the aborted recoveries that 
Mitchell and Bums (1936) noted in 1930, 1931, and 1932. 
The second equilibrating factor that Temin alleges was  absent in 
1929-33  was a strong real-balance effect. He defines that effect, how- 
ever, as relating to the stock of money or the stock of money plus other 
financial assets. Yet the proper measure of  the real-balance effect is 
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sector-that  is, the sum of noninterest- and interest-bearing govern- 
ment liabilities. The nominal value of currency plus government debt 
increased 27  percent from  1929 to 1933; the real value increased 62 
percent. This may be described as a strong increase in real balances, 
whatever the strength of  the effect on spending for consumption. 
In Temin’s account, an unexplained change in spending set the econ- 
omy on its downward slide. No monetary change could stop the down- 
ward slide. An increase in the supply of money would not help, since 
the public had an excess supply of money. Things could get worse, as 
they did, when in September 1931 the Federal Reserve for the first time 
since 1929 in his view exerted a deflationary effect on the economy. 
Temin’s analytical structure is a throwback to the Keynesian position 
of  the quarter century after 1933. It has no theoretical explanation of 
the price level. It makes no distinction between nominal and real mag- 
nitudes. It presumes that no evidence exists on the relation of monetary 
change to income change. It ignores recent theoretical developments. 
The period 1929-33 began as a cyclical contraction much like others, 
this time in response to the immoderate concern of the Federal Reserve 
Board about speculation in the stock market. Application of the theory 
of stock values as affected by expectations of the growth of earnings 
now suggests, as Irving Fisher believed, that marked overvaluation of 
stocks was not general (Sirkin 1975). Had high employment and eco- 
nomic growth continued, prices in the stock market could have been 
maintained. In the event, restriction of the growth of money from 1928 
on produced a peak in business and some months later the stock market 
crash. A temporary increase in the money stock in October 1929 eased 
the effect of the shock of the crash. This may account for the increase 
in output recorded in early 1930 as a lagged effect of monetary growth. 
The economy was thus subjected to two sharp shocks: the initial 
restrictive money growth and then the collapse of stock prices. Still, 
what followed suggests an adjustment that moved the economy toward 
equilibrium, but not for long. It is not hard to explain why an unantic- 
ipated decline in aggregate demand will lead employers to hire fewer 
workers at each real wage rate as perceived by them and will  lead 
workers to refuse offers of work at lower nominal wages on the basis 
of  unchanged  anticipations.  Along rational-expectations  lines,  how- 
ever, employers and workers will in time revise their anticipations in 
accordance with the change in opportunities. If the Federal Reserve 
had maintained the initial moderate rate of decline in the money stock, 
presumably the economy after a time would have adjusted to this con- 
dition. But this is not what happened. The screw was tightened again 
and again, until 1932, and unanticipated change in each case required 
a new period of adjustment. To add to the problem, leading government 
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and share employment, which must have contributed to shorter average 
work weeks and higher layoffs. 
Still, one must acknowledge the resilience of the economy after the 
first shocks in 1929 and the first banking crisis at the end of  1930. In 
early  1931, some industries with relatively  smaller price declines re- 
vived. Again, the adjustment was aborted by a second round of banking 
failures, subsequently compounded by the Federal Reserve’s reaction 
to gold losses, in the autumn of  1931. The favorable shock in April 
1932, when the Federal Reserve System finally began an open-market 
purchase program in response to congressional pressure, produced a 
positive reaction in the economy. Prices began to move upward and 
output increased. The adjustment was short-lived. The purchase pro- 
gram ended in early August, and the political campaign spawned rumors 
about the condition of banks the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC) had aided. The consequence was a series of  runs that ended 
with the shutdown of all banks as the new administration took office. 
The economy  was  at its lowest ebb.  Yet  vigorous  growth  was  not 
precluded during the expansion phase that followed. 
A far more  satisfactory  explanation  of  1929-33  than  Temin’s is, 
therefore, that a series of negative shocks, monetary in origin, reduced 
real output and the demand for labor and shifted the demand for se- 
curities to short-term instruments and high-grade, long-term securities. 
Destroy a banking system, and the real economy will grind to a halt. 
There are no unexplained changes in spending that serve as deus ex 
machina. The presence  of  equilibrating forces is attested to by  the 
interludes during the course of the contraction when real output in- 
creased. The behavior of the economy was determined by public pol- 
icies. Different policies would have resulted in different behavior. 
Appendix 
Dissents from the Views in a Monetary History 
Temin rejects the account in A Monetary History of the way an initial 
mild decline in the money stock from 1929 to 1930, accompanying a 
decline in Federal Reserve credit outstanding, was converted into a 
sharp decline by a wave of bank failures beginning in late 1930. I shall 
discuss in turn five items in Temin’s catalog of dissent: (1) the money- 
stock identity, (2) the behavior of high-powered money, (3) the behavior 
of  interest rates, (4)  the price of  deflation and the behavior  of  real 
money balances, (5) the role of bank failures; and I will comment finally 132  Anna J. Schwartz 
(6)  on  his  and  others’  approaches  to  monetary  policy  during  the 
contraction. 
4.A.1  The Money-Stock Identity 
In A Monetary History, we used an  identity that relates money broadly 
defined to three proximate determinants: high-powered money, the de- 
posit-reserve ratio, and the deposit-currency ratio. The three proximate 
determinants reflect, respectively, the behavior of  the monetary  au- 
thorities (in the United States, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
System), the commercial banks,  and the public.  The monetary  au- 
thorities provide high-powered money-the  sum of reserves and cur- 
rency-that  the banks and public divide between themselves in light 
of the factors influencing the two sets of ratios. The deposit-reserve 
ratio is affected by legal reserve requirements, banks’ expectations of 
currency movements into and out of their vaults, and interest rates. 
The deposit-currency ratio is affected by interest rates, income, and 
the public’s preference for holding coin and currency. The ratios clearly 
reflect demand factors that interact with the supply of high-powered 
money. The argument of A Monetary History, as already noted, is that 
the Federal Reserve System through its control of  the issue of high- 
powered money can offset any undesired change by the other actors 
in some short run, and hence the system plays a dominant role in the 
control of the quantity of money. 
Temin believes he has isolated a fatal error in A Monetary History, 
because the identity suggests to him that the stock of money is deter- 
mined by supply factors alone, instead of being joined with a demand 
equation to determine equilibrium  supply in the market for money. 
Temin writes: 
Consider the stock of bonds. The size of the stock is the product of 
past decisions about corporate and government finance. It is fixed 
at any moment of time by these previous supply decisions. If  the 
demand for bonds shifts, it will not change the number of bonds in 
existence immediately; it will change their price. In the short run, 
therefore, the quantity of bonds is determined by the supply, and the 
price is determined by the demand. In the longer run, the price will 
be a function of both the supply and demand working through  a 
recursive relationship. Friedman and Schwartz employed the short- 
run part of this argument; they appear to have rejected the long-run 
part. (P.  18) 
According to Temin, we treat changes in the demand for money as 
affecting only the price of money, meaning the interest rate, and not 
quantity, the equilibrium stock of money. This is standard Keynesian 133  Understanding 1929-  1933 
doctrine, in which the price of money is defined as the interest rate 
rather than the reciprocal of the price level. 
The problem with Temin’s analysis, as with much Keynesian anal- 
ysis, is the assumption that the price level is predetermined and the 
resulting failure to treat the price level as a variable that helps to equate 
nominal demand for money  with  the  nominal supply  of  money  or, 
alternatively, to enable any level of real balances demanded to be at- 
tained for any level of nominal balances. Temin’s failure to recognize 
the importance of the distinction between nominal and real magnitudes 
leads him to stress instead the distinction between long run and short 
run, but this distinction is not highly relevant to the determination of 
the stock of money. Undoubtedly, different forces exert different in- 
fluences on the behavioral patterns underlying the proximate deter- 
minants in the short and long run. But in both runs, it is the behavioral 
patterns underlying the proximate determinants that determine the size 
of  the  nominal quantity of  money  outstanding. The demand forces 
emanating from the public that affect the nominal quantity of money 
are those that have to do with the forms among which they choose to 
distribute their nominal (or real) assets-the  fraction they choose to 
hold in real assets, securities of various kinds, bank deposits of various 
kinds,  and high-powered money. These demand forces interact with 
the supply conditions of high-powered money, and of various forms of 
deposits or securities, to determine the nominal quantity of  money. 
The demand for real money balances interacts with the nominal quan- 
tity of money to determine the price level. Of course, this is an oversim- 
plified statement. A more sophisticated statement would assert that all 
of these variables are determined simultaneously and that some of the 
variables that enter into the demand for real money balances may also 
enter into the functions that  determine the distribution of  the total 
balance sheet among various forms of assets. But the important point 
is fully brought out by the simplified picture: to leave price expectations 
out of the picture in the short run from 1929 on is to leave out a major 
part of the picture-both  for monetary analysis and for income analysis. 
As the public adjusts discrepancies between its actual real money bal- 
ances and desired real money balances, nominal income is altered and 
the breakdown into prices and output is determined. 
Temin alleges that the supply of money in our specification is “de- 
termined by forces independent of income and interest rates” (p. 19). 
Yet  we  specifically note that the deposit ratios are functions of the 
interest rate, among other variables (contrary to Ternin’s discussion, 
which suggests that we do not include it) and that the deposit-currency 
ratio is a function also of income. He is right that we regard banking 
panics as “far and away the most important single determinant” (p. 20) 
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episodes. How do we know this? By studying the pattern of behavior 
in these ratios during panic  episodes. The early  1930s do not stand 
alone. We  have evidence on the behavior of the ratios in all the post- 
Civil War panics in the United States. They tell a uniform story of a 
shift from  deposits to currency by  the public  once the economy  is 
engulfed in panic and of a belated attempt by banks to increase reserves 
relative to their deposits once the panic subsided. 
We  have evidence also from Canadian experience in  1929-33.  The 
percentage fall in Canadian nominal income over these years was about 
the same as in U.S.  nominal income, yet  the percentage fall in the 
Canadian stock of money was considerably smaller. The reason is that 
Canada was spared the ordeal of bank failures. There was no shift from 
deposits to currency in Canada comparable to that in the United States, 
and so there was no effect from this proximate determinant in producing 
a decline in the stock of money. There was no decline in the “quality” 
of deposits comparable to that in the United States because of a loss 
of confidence in banks, and hence there was less of a decline in the 
demand for real money  balances in Canada.  That is why a smaller 
decline in the quantity of money was consistent with almost the same 
decline in income and prices. The sharp decline in Canadian income 
and prices occurred because Canada kept its exchange rate with the 
United States fixed until September 1931 and then maintained its ex- 
change rate at a new level involving a smaller depreciation than that 
undergone by the pound sterling. For Canada, it is entirely appropriate 
to regard the quantity of money as adapting in large measure to move- 
ment in income and prices, rather than as an exogenous force. It was 
the tail. The United States was the dog. 
4.A.2  The  Behavior of High-powered Money 
The decline in the quantity of money from August 1929 to October 
1930, before the first banking panic, did not result from any weakness 
of the private economy. The decline was entirely the result of a decline 
in Federal Reserve credit outstanding. There were no problems with 
the banking structure, no attempted liquidation of loans by banks, no 
attempt by depositors to shift from deposits to currency that contrib- 
uted to reducing the quantity of money. In fact, the banks were reducing 
reserves relative to deposits, and the public was increasing its deposits 
relative to currency-enough to offset half the decline in Federal Re- 
serve credit. 
Temin counters that a decrease in bank discounts  at the Fed, in 
response to the decline in market interest rates, and not any failure of 
the Fed, was  responsible for the  decline  in  Federal Reserve  credit 
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in July  1929 to $189 million by September 1930. Total bank reserves 
fell about $40 million. Temin does not allude to the punitive attitude 
of  the system toward  member bank borrowing,  hence bypasses the 
reason there was little incentive for them to increase rediscounting, 
absent any panic, when the Reserve Banks lowered discount rates- 
“dramatically,”  according to him (p. 21)-and  he takes the absolute 
amount of discounting to be “low.”16 
In fact, the discount rate was not reduced uniformly at all Reserve 
Banks. By mid-1930, New York had reduced its rate in six steps from 
6 to 2.5 percent, while at other Reserve Banks the rate had gone from 
5 to 4 and 3.5 percent. By the end of  1930, the New York rate stood 
at 2 percent, the rates at two other banks at 3 percent,  and at the 
remaining nine  at 3.5 percent.  The discount rate fell less than the 
commercial paper rate even in New York; a lot less, in other districts. 
The spread between the commercial paper rate and the discount rate 
at New York was a shade lower in 1930 than in 1929; at other Reserve 
Banks, much lower. Of  course, under the lash of  runs by the public, 
the banks did increase their borrowings-from  $189 million in Septem- 
ber  1930 to $338 million in December. But this increase in Reserve 
Bank credit outstanding was smaller than the increase in the public’s 
currency holdings. 
Temin’s general Keynesian tendency to treat interest rates as the 
crucial monetary variable leads him astray in evaluating both the role 
of  the  Fed and our views about its responsibility.  For example, he 
writes that the Federal Reserve “could have offset changes in interest 
rates by  changing the discount rate, and it could have avoided the 
banking panics by changing its procedures”  (p. 20).  That is not our 
view.  We  put  major emphasis, not  on discount rate changes or on 
“procedures,”  but on Federal Reserve control of high-powered money, 
or bank reserves, through open-market operations. 
From our view, the crucial question is whether the Federal Reserve 
was powerless to engage in open-market purchases to restore the level 
of its credit outstanding, given that, until the first banking panic, the 
banks, for whatever reason, were not willing to come to the discount 
window. Temin’s discussion of the system’s behavior is ambiguous, to 
say the least: 
No one disputes that the Fed has the power to undertake open-market 
operations. And most people agree that these actions have effects 
on the economy. But very few of the monetary changes in the early 
1930’s were the results of  conscious decisions to undertake open- 
market operations. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the decline 
in the stock of money in 1930 was the result of a fall in discounts at 
the Fed in response to a fall in market rates not fully duplicated by 
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the two deposit ratios produced by the banking crises. These events 
are not the same as open-market purchases. (P. 25) 
These events clearly are the opposite of open-market purchases, which 
would have increased Reserve credit outstanding and high-powered 
money. They are precisely the kind of events that conventional central- 
bank wisdom would regard as  requiring open-market purchases in order 
to offset their effects. Temin objects that we imply that “all  changes 
in the stock of money were the results of actions by the Federal Re- 
serve”  (p. 25). They  are the  results  of  actions or inactions  by  the 
Federal  Reserve.  In  1930  before  the  panic  condition  developed  at 
the end of the year, the Federal Reserve could have readily reversed 
the decline in Federal Reserve credit outstanding. Temin evades the 
central issue of why they did not do so. 
Temin makes much of the fact that high-powered money on an annual 
average continued to increase except in 1930. Hence, he argues, there 
was no restraint on the supply of money. High-powered money grew 
after the first banking crisis, not because member bank reserves were 
expanding, but because the public’s currency holdings began to climb 
in the usual shift of its preferences toward currency as an aftermath 
of the banking crisis. By August 1931, the public’s currency holdings 
had increased by $583 million over its holdings in October 1930, but 
high-powered money was only $558 million higher. High-powered money 
growth, barely adequate to meet the public’s growing distrust of bank 
deposits, had contractionary effects on the reserve position of the bank- 
ing system-hardly  impressive evidence of monetary ease. 
4.A.3  The Behavior of Interest Rates 
According to Temin, the money hypothesis fails its most important 
test because there is no evidence in interest rates of monetary strin- 
gency at the end of  1930 as the result of bank failures. Temin has not 
examined the data for earlier panics, but it is true that short-term rates 
in those episodes did rise during the weeks of panic, and we do not 
observe a comparable rise during the weeks of the first banking crisis 
in the last quarter of  1930 or of the second banking crisis from March 
to June 1931.” The failure of short-term rates to rise, however, is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the presence of monetary stringency- 
both because monetary stringency might be reflected in prices rather 
than in interest rates and because other factors were simultaneously 
impinging on short-term rates. In particular, the failure of short-term 
rates to rise may have reflected, first, declines in the 1920s in the supply 
of short-term instruments issued by both private borrowers and the 
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demanders of these short-term instruments. There are two markets to 
consider, the commercial paper market and the market for short-term 
government securities. 
The commercial paper market today is a different market from the 
one that existed in the 1920s through the Great Contraction.’* In today’s 
market, the finance companies are the dominant borrowers.  In  the 
1920s, corporate enterprises in textiles, foodstuffs, metals, and leather 
were the main borrowers. There was a dramatic decline in the market 
from  1924 to  1933, interrupted by a brief expansion from the stock 
market crash to April 1930. Outstandings fell from a peak of $925 million 
in October 1924 to a low of $265  million in September 1929, largely 
because firms that had formerly borrowed  in  the commercial paper 
market found it more advantageous to float stocks and bonds.  The 
stock market crash and the reduction in commercial paper rates relative 
to bank lending rates led to a rise in outstandings in April 1930 to $553 
million. Thereafter, the volume declined to $358 million in December 
1930 and $275 million in August 1931. 
Currently, nonfinancial corporations  are the main holders of com- 
mercial paper. In the 1920s through the Great Contraction, the banks 
were virtually the sole buyers of commercial paper, with country banks 
the mainstay of  the market. From the member bank call date of De- 
cember 31, 1930, through the September 29, 1931, call date, member 
bank holdings of commercial paper ranged from 102 to 141 percent of 
the reported total amount outstanding, the excess over the reported 
amount outstanding rising steadily over the interval covered. The ex- 
planation for the excess is that the banks purchased paper from dealers 
other than those reporting to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
and is one indication of the strength of member bank demand for com- 
mercial paper. 
The chief advantage of commercial paper to member banks apart 
from its yield was its eligibility for rediscount at the Reserve Banks. 
This advantage gained in importance during a panic, so that, from the 
demand side, a panic, rather than putting pressure on commercial paper 
rates,  to some extent relieved  the pressure. Instead of  selling com- 
mercial paper, banks increased borrowings using commercial paper as 
collateral to meet depositors’ demand for currency. As we have seen, 
bills discounted rose in the last quarter of 1930 and again in June 193 1, 
the culmination of the second banking panic. With limited supply and 
persistent demand, the failure of commercial paper rates to rise during 
the panic in no way contradicts the money hypothesis. 
With respect to the government securities market, the reduction of 
the public debt, dating from 1919, continued through December 1930. 
This constituted an increase in the supply of loanable funds, thereby 
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level. The increase in the public debt was small through August 1931, 
so the influence on the supply of  loanable funds and hence on the 
upward pressure on interest rates from this source must likewise have 
been small (see table 4.A.1). 
As is true for later years also, we lack adequate data on the maturity 
distribution of the debt, 1929-31.  Treasury bills-first  issued in De- 
cember 1929-and  certificates of indebtedness had a maturity of less 
than one year when issued; Treasury notes, of three to five years; and 
bonds, of more than five years. When purchased or held, however, the 
remaining maturity might be quite different from the original maturity. 
So the distribution of security holdings among the indicated categories 
is only a rough index of their distribution by maturity. 
Of the reduced total of the public debt, through December 1930, less 
than 10 percent of member bank holdings were in less than one-year 
maturities when issued; four-fifths were in long-term bonds (see table 
4.A.2). Their holdings amounted to less than one-quarter of the bills 
and certificates outside the Federal Reserve from the October 1929 call 
date through the June 1930 call date, rose to three-tenths at the Sep- 
tember 1930 call date when the first banking panic had not yet erupted, 
and then to three-eighths by the call date in December after the Bank 
of  United  States had  been  suspended. In  1931, the composition of 
member bank  holdings of  government securities  shifted  toward  the 
short-term when issued, probably reflecting a shift in the composition 
Table 4.A.1  U.S. Federal Government Interest-bearing  Debt Outstanding, 
Various Months, 1929-31 (in Millions of Dollars) 
Certificates 
Situation as of  Treasury  of  Treasury 
Last Day of  Bonds  Notes  Indebtedness  Bills  Total 
June  1929 
Aug.  1929 
Oct.  1929 
Dec.  1929 
Mar.  1930 
June  1930 
Sept. 1930 
Oct.  1930 
Nov.  1930 
Dec.  1930 
Mar.  1931 
June  1931 
Aug.  1931 
Sept. 1931 










































































Source: U.S. Treasury Department 1929-31. Table 4.A.2  Cbief Kinds of U.S. Government Direct Obligations Held by Member Banks, Member Bank Call Dates, 1929-31 
Member Bank Holdings  Holdings as Percent of Total 
(Millions of  Dollars)  Bank Holdings in:  Amounts Outside FR Banks 
Bills and  Bills and  Bills and 
Percent of Total Member 
Total  Certificates  Notes  Bonds  Certificates  Notes  Bonds  Total  Certificates  Notes  Bonds 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
1929 
June  29 
Oct.  4 
Dec.  31 
Mar.  27 
June  30 
Sept. 24 
Dec.  31 
Mar.  25 
June  30 
Sept. 29 


























































16.9  72.3  26.3  28.8 
16.5  74.4  25.0  24.0 
13.5  80.1  24.9  21.0 
12.8  80.5  26.3  23.4 
11.4  82.2  26.5  22.6 
10.2  81.6  26.9  30.7 
11.8  79.3  27.4  37.6 
6.6  75.4  31.9  42.2 
7.5  75.6  33.7  44.5 
6.7  76.9  34.1  54.2 
8.3  78.9  31.8  33.7 
32.6  24.8 
26.5  24.8 
22.6  25.7 
21.9  27.5 
21.0  27.9 
19.4  27.9 
22.9  27.4 
30.1  30.3 
67.8  30.5 
60.5  30.5 
57.9  30.1 
Sources, by columns: (1): Sum of cols. (2)-(4).  (2)-(4):  US.  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1943,  p. 77. (8): Holdings of 
the Federal Reserve Banks were deducted from the total of  the three kinds of debt outstanding (ibid., pp. 332,  343,375,509-10);  col. (1)  was 
expressed as a percentage of  the difference.  (9x11):  Procedure similar to that for col. (8), except that no breakdown of Federal Reserve 
holdings was available except at Dec. 31;  the percentage distribution of the three kinds of debt was assumed the same at other dates in each 
year as on the following Dec. 31. 140  Anna J. Schwartz 
of outstandings, but also reinforcing the growing concentration of bank 
demand on these issues, already manifested in December 1930. Bank 
holdings of short-term governments were more than 50 percent of out- 
standings in September 1931, and 60 percent of outstanding medium- 
term governments. 
Mayer (1978b) asks whether one would not expect “the demand for 
other assets to decline, and hence their yields to rise”  (p. 140) when 
bank failures reduced the money supply. But the short-term assets for 
which we have yield information, primarily commercial paper and short- 
term governments, are not those for which demand declined. The banks 
dominated these markets, and with good reason. After the experience 
of two banking panics, the remaining banks chose to acquire assets 
with assured convertibility into cash sums at need and at short notice. 
Short-term governments did not experience the unremitting declines 
in rates that characterized the commercial paper market in 1930. Con- 
tinuous monthly data are available only for the yields on three- to six- 
month Treasury notes and certificates (see figure 4.A. 1). (There were 
only five issues of Treasury bills that year, so there are quotations only 
on new offerings.) As the chart in figure 4.A.  1 shows, small increases 
in yields occurred during three months in 1930-5  basis points in April, 
27  in September, and 8 in December, the month the Bank of United 
States failed. 
Given these conditions in both the commercial paper and short-term 
government markets until Britain cut loose from gold on September 
21, 193 1, why did the commercial paper rate rise from 2 percent, during 
the week ending October 3, to 4.13, during the week ending November 
14, after which it continued an uninterrupted decline to the week ending 
with the Bank Holiday-its  low point during the contraction of  1.38 
percent? Why  did the average rate on new issues of Treasury bills, 
which reached a low of 0.485 percent in July 1931, rise steadily there- 
after to 3.253 percent in December 1931? Outstandings of commercial 
paper continued  to decline to the end of  the year,  but outstanding 
Treasury bills rose somewhat. It is clear from the pattern of  short-term 
rates of private instruments that the rate rise followed the increase in 
the discount rate at New York on October 9, from 1.5 to 2.5 percent, 
and on October 16, to 3.5 percent. In this instance, the Federal Reserve 
led the market. In the discount rate reductions from November 1929 
to May  1931, it followed the market. In the short-term government 
market, an added factor contributing to the rise in interest rates may 
have been the increase in Treasury notes. 
Bills  discounted  had  been  rising from July  1931, when  discounts 
averaged $169 million, to $282 million in September. They then rose to 
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Fig. 4.A.1  Yields on three- to six-month treasury notes and certificates, 
1919-33.  Source: U.S.  Board  of Governors of  the Federal 
Reserve System 1943, p. 460. 
In addition to the increase in their indebtedness, member banks lost 
$74 million in reserves between July and September 1930 and a further 
$426 million between September 1931 and February 1932. 
Interest rate behavior is not, then, inconsistent with monetary strin- 
gency both before and after September 193 1. The pattern of short-term 
interest rate declines before September 193 1 reflected firm demand by 
commercial banks for commercial paper and short-term government 
securities and a generally declining supply of these instruments. When 
the Federal Reserve increased discount rates sharply in October 1931 , 
it led market rates, pulling them up, whereas its earlier discount rate 
reductions followed market rate declines. 
Temin, however, is right in arguing that short-term interest rates are 
the ones to examine because they most nearly resemble holding-period 
yields. For long-term rates, only yields to maturity are available, al- 142  Anna J. Schwartz 
though  investors  make plans  on the basis  of  holding-period yields. 
Temin therefore regards long-term rates as unsuitable for analysis be- 
cause they are complicated for the years 1928-31  by the growing risk 
of default for some bonds and the rising price of risk. 
In A Monetary History, we noted that while both long- and short- 
term interest rates had been declining before the first banking crisis, a 
widening spread began to emerge, synchronous with the first crisis, 
between yields to maturity  on lower-grade corporate bonds and on 
government bonds as yields on corporate bonds rose sharply and yields 
on government bonds continued to fall. Temin says “this  suggestion 
will not stand up” (p. 105) because bond prices began to fall well before 
the panic, and only the prices of lower-grade bonds fell; the prices of 
high-grade corporate and government bonds stayed roughly constant. 
The point  of  Temin’s insistence that the value of  bank portfolios 
declined well before the bank panic of 1930 is that the price decline of 
bonds was not a result of the liquidity scramble but rather a cause. He 
argues that bonds were being moved from one quality class to another 
so that movements in the Baa rate do not show the change in the price 
of banks’ portfolios. The price decline in any actual bond portfolio in 
the  1930s was the result of  both  the decline in the price of a given 
quality class and the decline in the quality ratings of the bonds in the 
portfolio.  The yields on the fixed sample of bonds that Temin con- 
structed for December and June dates 1928-31  rise continuously and 
far exceed the yields on Baa bonds. 
No one disputes that bond prices were depressed in 1928 and 1929 
while the boom in equities was in full swing. Temin’s assertion that 
yields on high-grade corporate and on government bonds thereafter 
were constant is hard to assess. Yields on high-grade corporate bonds 
fell from December 1929 through October 1930, from 4.67 to 4.42. At 
the end of 1930, during the months of panic, they rose to 4.52. They 
then resumed  a decline to 4.36 in July  1931. Yields to maturity on 
government bonds fell from 3.43 in January 1930 to 3.19 in November 
1930, then rose to 3.30 in February 1931, falling thereafter until June, 
when  the  yield  was  3.13.  These small changes are consistent  with 
monetary stringency before the first banking panic-given  the steady 
decline in commodity prices, so that real rates rose appreciably; and 
the upward movements and subsequent declines at the end of 1930 are 
consistent with an intensification of  monetary stringency during the 
panic. 
In any event, the relative constancy of high-grade yields does not 
contradict the argument that the sale of low-grade bonds was induced 
by a scramble for liquidity. Temin counters that banks were net sellers 
of bonds in  1931 because  “they  perceived  the risk more quickly or 
because they were more risk averse than individuals. The fact that they 143  Understanding 1929- 1933 
sold while individuals bought is not evidence of  a liquidity scramble” 
(p. 106 n.). This ignores the effect that dumping securities, for what- 
ever motives, by some banks produced on the values of the investment 
portfolios of other banks. As for money and income, there is no reason 
to expect a one-way relation. The reflex  influence of  bond  sales in 
setting off other bond sales is the essence of a liquidity crisis that Temin 
fails to recognize. 
4.A.4  Price Deflation and the Behavior of Real Balances 
Temin argues that the distinction between nominal interest rates and 
real interest rates can be  neglected. To  begin  with,  he doubts that 
anyone apart from professional economists makes such a distinction. 
Further, even if  the distinction were made, it would not salvage the 
monetary explanation. If  high real interest rates dominated all other 
explanations of  1929-33,  he asks, why  do we not observe a similar 
effect in  1920-21  with a greater deflation and the same institutional 
constraint that nominal interest rates cannot be negative? There were 
indeed high real rates in  1920-21,  but their effect was not prolonged 
by banking panic effects on the money stock. 
The final major indication for Temin that monetary causes cannot 
account for the severity of  the economic decline is that real balances 
did not decline. Because prices fell so rapidly, the stock of real money 
balances did not fall from 1929 to 1931; hence, in his view there could 
not have been any deflationary effect from the decrease in the nominal 
stock of  money. He asks: 
Why . . . should the level of  real expenditures and hence of  em- 
ployment have been lower in, say, 1931 than in  1929 since the real 
stock of money was larger by all of the measures shown in Table 23? 
(P.  142) 
For Temin, there is no contradiction between his  assertion that the 
demand (i.e., demand function) for nominal balances declined while 
real balances (i.e., quantity of  real balances held) were constant or 
increased. Real money balances are a statistical construct that he ex- 
amines merely because quantity theorists consider it important. If  he 
thought it represented the basic monetary total demanded, he would 
have had to explain why a decline in the demand for money did not 
produce a rise in prices, for a fixed nominal stock, to produce a decline 
in real money balances. 
If  one regards real money balances as the basic monetary total de- 
manded, there is no evidence that the demand function declined. Gan- 
dolfi and Lothian (1976) have shown that the function that predicts 
actual real money balances for 1900-1929 predicts actual real money 144  Anna J. Schwartz 
balances during the Great Contraction with no loss in predictive power. 
The demand for real money balances is conventionally defined as re- 
lated positively to real income and negatively to the rate of interest. 
Hence the movement of real balances over the cycle depends on the 
relative movements of  the determinants. There is no evidence of a 
leftward shift in the demand curve during the Great Contraction. The 
rise in real money balances to 193 1 and similarly the decline from 193 1 
to 1933 were due to changes in the determinants of the demand. There 
were movements along the demand function, not a shift in the function, 
as Temin would have it. 
Gandolfi and Lothian have also challenged Temin’s assumption that 
a fall in the nominal quantity of money accompanied by a corresponding 
fall in prices should leave real output unchanged, since real balances 
remain constant. In this case, Temin fails to note a distinction between 
anticipated and unanticipated price change. Suppose output depends 
on the price of output relative to expected price of  inputs. An unan- 
ticipated fall in all prices, given imperfect information on input prices, 
will be perceived by producers as a relative fall in output prices. Temin 
ignores a growing literature on the supply effect of unanticipated price 
changes on real output change. Hence his assertion that the behavior 
of  real balances is inconsistent with a monetary explanation of  the 
contraction is untenable. 
4.A.5  The Role of Bank Failures 
As indicated earlier, Temin’s explanation of the role of bank failures 
is that they served as the channel through which the supply of money 
adjusted to the falling demand. He alleges that the banking panic of 
October 1930 was induced by the decline in agricultural income and in 
the prices of relatively risky long-term securities presumably held by 
banks and, in particular, that the failure of  the Bank of  United States 
in the course of that panic did not precipitate a liquidity crisis. In A 
Monetary History we devoted a section to the question of the origin 
of bank failures during the contraction. Did the failures arise primarily 
because of imprudent financial practices of the 1920s? Or were they 
the product of developments of the early 1930s? 
Whatever may have been true of the initial bank failures in the first 
banking crisis, any ex ante deterioration in the quality of loans and 
investments in the later twenties or simply the acquisition of low- 
quality loans and investments in that period, even if  no different in 
quality than in earlier periods, was a minor factor in the subsequent 
bank failures. As we have seen, the banking system as a whole was 
in a position to meet the demands of depositors for currency only 
by a multiple contraction of deposits, hence of  assets. Under such 145  Understanding 1929- 1933 
circumstances, any runs on banks for whatever reason became to 
some extent self-justifying, whatever the quality of assets held by 
banks. Banks had to dump their assets on the market which inevitably 
forced a decline in the market value of  those assets and hence of the 
remaining assets they held. The impairment in the market value of 
assets held by banks, particularly in their bond portfolios, was the 
most important source of impairment of capital leading to bank sus- 
pensions, rather than the default of specific loans or of specific bond 
issues. (P. 355) 
So even if we were to concede that all the banks that failed in the first 
banking panic beginning October 1930 were bad banks that deserved 
to fail, this series of failures would have provoked difficulties for other 
good banks, the market value of whose assets would have been affected 
by the dumping of assets by the failing banks. Such failures could well 
have promoted panic among all depositors. In a panic the public is 
mired in doubts that institutions are as sound as they are said to be. 
I believe that the concession to Temin about the first banking crisis 
is not supported by the evidence, however. Good banks went down in 
that panic. His allegation that the Bank of United States failed because 
of fraudulent practices of its officers will not be sustained by an im- 
partial examination of the record of the bank. The charge of fraud tells 
you something about the temper of the times, not the facts of the case. 
Moreover, the panic of October 1930 does not stand alone in the 
U.S.  monetary history if  we look back this time, not forward to the 
succeeding banking crises from 1931 to 1933. Cagan (1965) noted in his 
study, to which Temin does not refer, that panics in U.S.  monetary 
history appeared in the early stages of cyclical contraction and therefore 
themselves could not have been the major cause of the contractions. 
He concluded that panics made ordinary business contractions severe 
when they led to a substantial decline in the rate of monetary growth 
and not otherwise. “Substantial decline in this rate, by itself, and with 
no panic, could and has produced severe business contraction” (p. 267). 
4.A.6  Monetary Policy 
I turn finally to the issue of monetary policy during the Great Con- 
traction.  In A Monetary History we argued that alternative policies 
were available that the Federal Reserve System could have pursued 
and that would have made the contraction less severe. Temin refuses 
to be drawn into a discussion of alternative policies.  “The  question 
posed” in his book “is not whether some alternative policy would have 
worked, but rather what happened to make such a corrective policy 
desirable”  (p. 7). Nevertheless, he has himself referred to alternative 
policies, himself conducted a counterfactual “thought experiment,” as 146  Anna J. Schwartz 
he labeled our section on alternative policies. It is counterfactual for 
Temin to state that, had there been no bank failures, the quantity of 
money would have been reduced to the same extent by a rise in the 
reserve-deposit ratio rather than the rise in the currency-deposit ratio 
that actually occurred. And this counterfactual assertion is refuted by 
Cagan’s study. Temin assumes that the reserve-deposit ratio would have 
risen as a result of the decline in interest rates in the absence of bank 
failures. Cagan finds little interest elasticity in this ratio and concludes 
that the larger part of the change in the ratio was related to panics. A 
lagged reaction to a panic on the part of banks was to raise the ratio 
of their reserves to their deposit liabilities. 
But to turn to the main question: We  do have some evidence for 
1930-3 1  on what alternative policies would have accomplished.  We 
know that when the Federal Reserve System finally undertook open- 
market purchases  of  $1  billion between April and August  1932, the 
money stock grew at a 1.75 percent annual rate of rise from September 
1932 until January 1933 compared with the preceding 14 percent annual 
rate of decline. We  know that industrial production rose 14 percent in 
the second half of 1932 after sharp earlier declines and that commodity 
prices rose in the second and third quarters of 1932 after declining in 
the two preceding years. Temin counters that we merely assume that 
the change in the quantity of money changes the level of income and 
do not disprove the possibility of reverse causation. Can he really mean 
that the Federal Reserve undertook the open-market purchases in 1932 
as a passive response to an increased demand for money that was a 
result of rising output and prices that lagged the change in monetary 
policy? There is evidence also on what alternative policies would have 
accomplished if we turn to the system’s open-market purchases in 1924 
and 1927. The omission of discussion of these policy measures in Tem- 
in’s book reflects his assumption that money is passive. Supply simply 
adjusts to the demand. This is a real-bills vision with a vengeance. 
In A Monetary History we found a contrast between the policy ac- 
tions of the Federal Reserve in  1924 and 1927 on the one hand and 
1930-33  on the other.  Elmus Wicker (1966) denies such a contrast, 
arguing that international considerations accounted for the open-market 
purchases in  the ’20s and that international considerations were un- 
important in 1930-33.  In his view, the Federal Reserve never accepted 
domestic economic stability as a goal of monetary policy. Brunner and 
Meltzer (1968) also deny the contrast, arguing that in all three con- 
tractions, if market rates, particularly short-term rates, fell, policy was 
regarded as expansive, and if market rates rose, policy was regarded 
as contractionary. In the earlier contractions, gold inflows and a decline 
in  the demand for currency  and  bank  loans  produced  a decline  in 
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a result, money supply rose and the economy recovered. In 1929-30, 
gold inflows and declines in the demand for currency and bank loans 
also produced a decline in interest rates, but high-powered money and 
the money supply fell. Hence the economy continued to deteriorate. 
But, as Brunner and Meltzer document, nearly all of the members of 
the Open Market Committee regarded monetary policy as easy. 
We  regard Wicker’s view as untenable. If  the Federal Reserve did 
not accept domestic economic stability as a goal of monetary policy, 
why did the system allocate resources to improving the data on eco- 
nomic activity, why did the staff prepare detailed studies on the state 
of the domestic economy in preparation for open-market committee 
meetings, why did the system claim credit for domestic prosperity when 
it occurred? There is without doubt some merit to the Brunner-Meltzer 
analysis, yet it cannot be accepted as a complete description of the 
situation. After all, the governor and the chief economists on the staff 
of  the New York Federal Reserve Bank all recognized that the decline 
in interest rates was not equivalent to monetary ease; they urged, and 
with some support from others in and outside the system, extensive 
open-market purchases at various times in  1930, 1931, and 1932 and 
were not dissuaded from doing so by the decline in interest rates. And 
these were the people who, so long as Benjamin Strong was alive, 
effectively dominated Federal Reserve policy. Hence, we continue to 
believe that had Strong lived or had he been succeeded by someone 
of similar views and equal personal force, the same monetary growth 
policies followed in 1924 and 1927 would have been followed in 1930, 
hence the decline in high-powered money either would not have oc- 
curred or would have been promptly reversed, and the economy would 
have been spared its prolonged ordeal. 
Notes 
1. In their study of production during the business-cycle contraction of 1929- 
The long decline was interrupted by three partial and abortive revivals. Of 
these, the first, in the early months of 1930, was brief and restricted  mainly 
to automobiles, steel, and heavy construction. The second, in the first half 
of  1931, had wider scope, lasted longer, and went further. It was especially 
pronounced in  the textile,  rubber tire,  shoe, and leather industries.  The 
revival in the summer and autumn of 1932 was fairly general, as is indicated 
by the preceding discussion of the “double bottom” in the terminal trough 
of this cycle. In some industries one of these abortive revivals lasted long 
enough and went far enough to produce an “extra” specific cycle during the 
depression. (P.  18) 
33, W.  C.  Mitchell and A. F.  Bums (1936) noted: 148  Anna J. Schwartz 
2. Haberler (1976, pp. 22-23)  notes that the Majority Report of the Gold 
Delegation of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations in 1932 also 
attributed the depression to maladjustments  caused by the war, but Gustav 
Cassel in a Memorandum of Dissent disputed the importance of maladjustments 
and stressed instead monetary phenomena-the  undervaluation of the French 
franc, the overvaluation of the pound, the cessation of U.S. capital exports, 
and the U.S.  depression. Maladjustments  were also the explanation of  the 
Great Depression  advanced in later studies issued by the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (Arndt 1944) and the United Nations Economic Commis- 
sion for Europe (Svenillson 1954). 
3. Abramovitz, in private correspondence with me, has called to  my attention 
qualifications to this statement in his paper. He notes that since the “small- 
country” model in that paper was designed to apply to long swings, it was 
inappropriate for use within  a single business-cycle  contraction and, in  any 
event, could not apply in full force to the United  States. On the basis of a 
subsequent paper (1977), in which he analyzed models of a “large  country” 
and a “small country,” Abramovitz believes efforts by the Federal Reserve to 
sustain the growth of the U.S.  money supply in 1930-31,  unaccompanied by 
similar actions by leading European countries, would not have been adequate 
to prevent the massive decline in income that in fact occurred. 
4. See the appendix for a demonstration that Temin’s interpretation  of interest 
rate movements as showing no monetary stringency in 1930 and 1931 is con- 
tradicted by evidence on the supply of  and demand for the relevant money- 
market instruments during that period. 
5.  Christopher Sims (1972) introduced a sophisticated  alternative test of 
Granger causality between a pair of variables by running two regressions, with 
each as dependent variable and both leading and lagged values of the other as 
independent variables. 
6. George Garvy (1959, pp. 71-73)  has shown that bank debits to deposit 
accounts at these centers is a good proxy for nominal income. Peter Lindert 
(1981) objects to this conclusion  since Garvy (p. 87) also reports a lack of 
perfect conformity of cyclical movements in debits with interwar NBER ref- 
erence dates (debits lag the turns in January 1920 and July 1921 and skip turns 
in October 1926 and November 1927). Nonetheless, Moore (1961, vol.  1, chap. 
5) includes debits in his list of coincident indicators for that period.  Gordon 
and Wilcox (1981), using quarterly GNP estimates, obtained results similar to 
those in table 4.2. 
7. Eight years because of the need to include lagged values. 
8. One other approach to determine unidirectional  relationship  that some 
investigators  have reported involves cross-correlations of the innovations in 
X and  Y  processes derived from Box-Jenkins procedures. Christopher Sims 
(1977~)  has criticized that approach as biased “for any null hypothesis except 
the null hypothesis of no relation between the series.”  The defect in testing 
whether “x causes v,”  he points out, in a formulation 
(I)y = a(L)y + b(L)c(L)x  + v, 
“with a, b, and c, as polynomials in positive powers of the lag operator, L, 
and v uncorrelated with past values of y or x,”  is as follows: 
The null  hypothesis  “x does not  cause y”  is represented by  b(L) =  0. 
Whether or not a, b, and c are linear in the problem’s parameters, maximum 
likelihood will be, for stationary x, y, asymptotically equivalent to choosing 149  Understanding  1929-  1933 
a, b, and c to minimize the sum of squares of  v in the sample period.  With 
any fixed c, an asymptotically valid test of the null hypothesis can be obtained 
by  estimating  a  and  b jointly  by  maximum  likelihood  or nonlinear  least 
squares, then applying standard test statistics. Though this is not a difficult 
procedure, [the criticized author] instead chooses c as a filter which makes 
c(L)x serially uncorrelated, and chooses a as a filter which  makes a(L)y 
serially uncorrelated, then holding a and cjked,  estimates b. But this amounts 
to testing the significance of b by first estimating the regression  (1)  with b 
set to zero, then testing for the contribution of b to the regression  by ex- 
amining correlations between the residuals  of this first-stage equation and 
the omitted variables of the form c(L)x.  Anyone versed in the theory of least- 
squares regression will recognize this as involving a bias in favor of the null 
hypothesis, except in the special case when the omitted variables are un- 
correlated with the included variables. (P.  24) 
9. Contrary to Temin (1981),  the monetary events listed in  the tabulation 
are, in the main,  not  “changes in the quantity  of  money”  or  “changes  in 
[market] interest rates.”  They are events, like a change in the Federal Reserve 
discount rate or an episode of bank runs or Britain’s departure from gold or 
the  1932  open-market purchase program,  that are newsworthy and attract 
attention. They have immediate announcement effects. Moreover, a quick ad- 
justment of prices does not preclude a long distributed lag adjustment. A partial 
adjustment that shows up quickly is not equivalent to the full adjustment of 
prices. 
10. In a journal article that postdates Temin’s review, Barber (1978) traces 
the origins of the Great Depression to demographic factors that he links to a 
decline in the residential construction market in the United States and to “a 
markedly unfavourable influence on the capital spending plans of business firms 
throughout the developed world”  (p. 453). 
Annual growth in standardized nonfarm households declined from 3 percent 
per year to under 2 percent per year from 1924 to 1932. This is supposed to 
have  triggered  the decline  in  U.S.  residential  construction. Yet  the annual 
growth in standardized nonfarm households from the early 1950s to 1970 was 
lower than growth of households in any year from 1924 to 1932. Barber attempts 
to rationalize this inconsistency by citing the availability of mortgage finance 
since World War 11. In that case, the demand for housing is not dependent on 
demographic factors exclusively. 
Similarly, a rapid decline in the rate of  population growth after World War 
I in developed  countries, which  was accompanied  by a lower rate of labor- 
force growth in the United States and Germany, need not have had the con- 
sequence he assumes on capital spending. What evidence is there that firms 
throughout the world were aware of this demographic trend? 
Essentially,  Barber fails to establish  a connection between his  empirical 
evidence on the decline in population and disequilibrium in the steady-state 
growth  model he presents and a model that would  explain recessions. Dis- 
equilibrium in a steady-state sense does not explain why the peak in capital 
spending occurred in 1929 rather than 1928 or 1930. 
11. Temin tries to determine (1976, p. 64) from the components of real GNP 
whether 1930 was a more depressed year than 1921 or 1938. Table 4.4, based 
on Commerce annual estimates of GNP in current and 1958 prices, the GNP 
implicit price deflator, and the unemployment rate, is an alternative to Temin’s 
table which shows percentage  changes in Kendrick’s annual GNP estimates 150  Anna J. Schwartz 
in 1929 prices, the consumption and investment expenditures components of 
GNP, and merchandise exports deflated  by wholesale prices. For the Com- 
merce estimates, the components of GNP are available only since 1929. The 
first part of table 4.4, following Temin, relates the changes in the year following 
the peak in  1920,  1929, and  1937, to the magnitudes of the peak year.  The 
bottom half of the table relates the changes in the year following those peaks 
to the year preceding the peaks on the ground that the 1929 magnitudes were 
not typical of the interwar years. One may ask whether 1920 or 1937 was any 
more typical. In any event, such comparisons between consecutive or nearly 
consecutive annual figures are subject to substantial error because of possible 
differences  in  patterns within the base year and the comparison year.  For 
example, a cyclical peak in December preceded by a rapid rise during the year 
might be accompanied by a zero year-to-year change, despite a severe recession. 
For whatever such comparisons may be worth, the real income decline was 
somewhat greater in 1930 than in 1921, the rise in unemployment was smaller, 
and the price  decline was much  smaller.  In all of  these respects,  1938 was 
much the mildest of the three contraction years.  Over a two-year span, the 
results show the 1930 change to be even milder relative to 1921. Of course, 
1930 was a contraction year from beginning to end, whereas in 1921 a trough 
was reached in July, and in  1938, in June. In addition, Temin’s use of gross 
merchandise exports as if  that were  an independent  component of GNP is 
misleading. The variable normally examined in the national income accounts 
is net export of goods and services. The change in the variable from 1929 to 
1930 is one-third  the magnitude of the change Temin reports for gross mer- 
chandise exports. 
What sets 1930 apart from both 1921 and 1938 is that a banking panic that 
changed the monetary character of the contraction occurred in the last quarter 
of the year. In 1921 there were many bank suspensions-triple  the number in 
1920, for a total of 505 banks with deposits of $172 million. In 1930, there were 
1,350 bank suspensions, with deposits of $837  million.  In 1938, post-FDIC, 
suspensions are negligible, 54 banks with $10 million in deposits. Despite the 
increase in bank  suspensions in  1921, there were no runs on banks. That is 
what distinguishes  1930 from 1921-there  was panic in  1930 but not in  1921. 
Bank suspensions in 1921 were perceived by the public as special problems of 
agricultural and rural areas but not as affecting confidence in banks generally. 
12. On the role of real wages, see section 4.5 of this paper. 
13. The fall in prices made the Smoot-Hawley tariff level even higher than 
it otherwise would have been since specific duties are automatically raised with 
a declining price level (Haberler 1976, p. 34, n. 65). Meltzer (1976, pp. 459- 
60)  assigns a large role to the Smoot-Hawley tariff and subsequent tariff re- 
taliation by many countries in exacerbating the 1929-33  contraction. The effect 
of the tariffs was to impede the price-specie flow mechanism and the adjustment 
of the U.S. and the world economy. Absent the tariff, U.S. prices would have 
fallen relative to those abroad and led to an increase in foreign demand and 
net exports. 
The protectionist  policy that influential British economists in 1930 advised 
the British government to adopt played  a role there parallel  to that of  the 
Smoot-Hawley  tariff in the United States. In his memoir about the “golden 
age” of the great British economists, Colin Clark (1977) discusses a “might- 
have-been’’ : 
It is now unmistakably  clear that what  Britain, being still a power strong 
enough to give a lead to the world, should have done in 1930-31, irrespective 151  Understanding 1929- 1933 
of whether or not other countries so acted, would have been to have pre- 
served Free Trade, accompanied by  an expansionist  demand policy,  and 
allowing the exchange rate to move freely in response to market pressures. 
It is now universally agreed that the exchange rate had been overvalued on 
the return to the Gold Standard in 1925, and a reduction would, in any case 
have been required.  (Though he had protested strongly against the overval- 
uation in 1925, Keynes himself was not recommending devaluation in 1930- 
31-the  only prominent men to recommend the policy were R. G. Hawtrey, 
the Treasury’s economic adviser, and Ernest Bevin.) Once the exchange rate 
had been freed, a strongly expansionist  policy  would  have been possible. 
The preservation of free trade would  have allowed the benefits of this ex- 
pansion to flow to other countries and also, a matter of equal importance, 
would  have  set the right  example, and spread economic expansion more 
widely over the world. (P. 90) 
Clark’s “might-have-been”  applied a fortiori to the case of the United States. 
14. In A Monetary History, we noted that since China was on a silver stan- 
dard, it was hardly affected internally,  1929-31, by the worldwide economic 
contraction. Choudri and Kochin (1977) provide similar evidence for Spain for 
those years. Spain then had flexible exchange rates and a reasonably stable 
monetary policy. 
15. Allan Meltzer (1976) traces the start of  the contraction to “economic 
policies in the United States and other countries operating under the rules of 
the interwar gold standard”  (p. 457). In his view, a relative decline in prices 
in the United  States, as in  1928-29,  under the price-specie flow mechanism 
can induce a recession abroad. He attempts to account for subsequent U.S. 
price change by relating anticipated price change at the start of the year to the 
average rate of monetary growth in the preceding three years relative to the 
rate of monetary expansion in the most recent year, with acceleration from 
the maintained average having much the larger effect under the gold standard. 
He regards his predicted  rates of U.S.  price change for 1930-31  and 1933 as 
not substantially different from actual price change. For  1932, when the pre- 
dicted rate was only half the actual rate of  price decline, he concludes the 
decline cannot be explained by the price-specie flow mechanism and the ex- 
pected response to monetary contraction. 
16. The percentage of eligible paper offered for rediscount rejected by the 
Reserve Banks of New York,  Dallas,  Philadelphia,  and St. Louis (of those 
reporting such figures) was higher in 1930 than in 1929, possible evidence that 
acceptability  standards were higher despite the decline in discount rates. Of 
course, member banks had the option of borrowing against their 15-day prom- 
issory notes secured by government obligations.  See Beckhart, Smith, and 
Brown (1932). 
17. Minor increases in yields on short- and long-term governments and on 
municipals are reported for December 1930 and March-April 1931. 
Brunner and Meltzer (1968) interpret the persistent decline in  short-term 
interest rates despite currency drains and bank failures as the result of adven- 
titious  factors offsetting  the effects on short-term market rates that would 
otherwise have been observed. They cite an inflow of gold-mostly  from South 
America and Japan-in  the last quarter of 1930 (p. 343). 
18. On the change in the character of the commercial paper market since 
the 1920s, see Selden (1963). The commercial paper market during the 1920s 
is discussed in Beckhart (1932). 